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INTRODUCTION
In the arid western United States, water is gold.' As the population
increases and global warming reduces water supplies, state governments,
metropolitan areas, farmers, ranchers, and American Indian 3 tribes are vy-
ing for their share of a shrinking supply. In particular, American Indians
in the Southwest depend on having enough water for irrigation, domestic
use, and economic development because their reservations are located on
dry, barren land. The United States Supreme Court has protected Indian
water rights by guaranteeing that Indians are entitled to sufficient water to
meet their current and future needs. These reserved rights are sometimes
called Winters rights, named for the case that first recognized them.6 The
Winters doctrine articulates the principle that Indians are entitled to as
much reserved water as is necessary for them to make full use of their
1. See Pauline Arrillaga, Water Settlements Could Help Indians Thrive Economically,
SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Nov. 3, 2002, at A4 (referring to water as "liquid gold").
2. Andrew Bridges, Global Warming to Shrink Water Supply in West, Study Finds, SAN
DIEGO UNION TIB., Nov. 24,2002, at A4.
3. The term "Indian" rather than "Native American" is used in this article in ac-
cordance with most of the case law and literature on this topic. See, e.g., Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546, 599 (1963) [hereinafter Arizona I];JudithV Royster, A Primer on
Indian Water Rights: More Questions Than Answers, 30 TULSA L.J. 61 (1994).
4. See David H. Getches, Management and Marketing of Indian Water: From Conflict to
Pragmatism, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 515, 516 (1988) [hereinafter Marketing of Indian Water]
(discussing the historical, sacred history of water for various Indian tribes).
5. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908).
6. Id.
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reservation land.' In the course of adjudicating the rights to the Colorado
River in Arizona v. California ("Arizona 1"),8 the Supreme Court set the
standard for quantifying tribal Winters rights, holding that Indian reserva-
tions are entitled to as much water as is necessary to irrigate all
"practicably irrigable" reservation land. 9 The Supreme Court reaffirmed
and refined the practicably irrigable acreage ("PIA") standard in a later
proceeding of Arizona v. California ("Arizona I1").' °
Consequently, Winters rights give Indians potential control over vast
quantities of water. Because most Indian reservations were established in
regions before settlers arrived, Winters rights tend to give Indians priority
access to water over nearly all other users under the prior appropriations
system of water allocation prevailing the in western states." According to
the Executive Director of the Western States Water Resources Council,
Winters rights currently entitle Indians to enough water to tie up all of
the unallocated water in the West."1 In fact, according to Professor Storey,
"[b]illions of dollars have been invested in water resource projects benefit-
ing non-Indians but using water in which the Indians have a priority of
right., 13 In response to this threat to western metropolitan water supplies,
as well as the supplies of non-Indian farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, and
others, some states have fought to protect their non-Indian voters' water
rights. These states have argued that courts should therefore narrow the
scope of Indian reserved rights.
4
In November 2001, in In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use
Water in Gila River System and Source ("Gila V")," opponents of broad
7. Id.
8. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
9. Id. at 595-601 (quantifying Indian Winters rights as the amount of water neces-
sary to irrigate all "practicably irrigable acreage").
10. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983) [hereinafter Arizona II] (further
elaborating on the scope of Indian Winters rights in a later proceeding of the same adjudi-
cation of the Colorado River); see also infra notes 48-68 and accompanying text (discussing
Arizona I and Arizona II in depth).
11. See John A. Folk-Williams, The Use of Negotiated Agreements to Resolve Water Dis-
putes Involving Indian Rights, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 63, 66 (1988); see also Royster, supra note
3, at 67 (noting that "in most cases ... little water [is] removed from the reach of the Win-
ters doctrine" because of senior claims); infra notes 20-32 and accompanying text
(discussing the prior appropriations system and its application to Winters rights).
12. Karen Crass, Eroding the Winters Right: Non-Indian Water Users'Attempt to Limit
the Scope of the Indian Superior Entitlements to Western Water to Prevent Tribes From Water Bro-
kering, I U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 109, 109 n.1 (1994) (quoting the Executive Director of
the Western States Water Resource Council).
13. Lee Harold Storey, Leasing Indian Water off the Reservation: A Use Consistent With
the Reservation s Purpose, 76 CAL. L. REV. 179, 181 (1988) (citing NATIONAL WATER COM-
MISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE-FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 51-61, at 476 (1973)).
14. See id. at 182.
15. 35 P3d 68 (Ariz. 2001) [hereinafter Gila V].
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Indian reserved water rights convinced the Arizona Supreme Court to
abandon the PIA standard established by the U.S. Supreme Court for
measuring and defining water rights for American Indians.' 6 The Arizona
court substituted a criteria that granted Indians a much narrower
entitlement.1 7 This was the first time a court abandoned the practicably
irrigable acreage standard for quantifying Indian Winters rights as
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Arizona I and Arizona 11.18
Part I of this Note examines the development of Indian reserved
water rights, and the practicably irrigable acreage method of quantifying
those rights, as defined by the Court. Part II describes the arguments of
state and private interests that oppose broad Indian water rights. Part III
discusses Gila V, including the Arizona Supreme Court's rationale for
abandoning the standard set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court and the
standard for quantifying Indian reserved rights that the court applied in its
place. Part IV analyzes the Arizona Supreme Court's justifications for
abandoning the standard, and considers alternate grounds for the decision.
Ultimately, this Note concludes that the Arizona Supreme Court misin-
terpreted precedent and wrongfully rejected the standard established by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Arizona I and Arizona II.'9 Thus, Gila V should
be viewed as an abrogation of the established standard for defining Indian
water rights and not serve as precedent.
I.THE HISTORY AND SCOPE OF INDIAN RESERVED RIGHTS
A. Water in the Western United States and the
Prior Appropriations Doctrine
Legal claims to water in most western states are governed by the
'0
"prior appropriations" doctrine. Originally adopted to promote
development of water resources2' by rewarding early capital investment in
16. Id. at 81.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 79.
19. For a contrary opinion, see Barbara A. Cosens, The Measure of Indian Water
Rights: The Arizona Homeland Standard, Gila Five Adjudication, 42 NAT. RES. J. 835 (2002).
Cosens views the PIA standard as prejudicial to Indian interests, and applauds the Arizona
Supreme Court's decision to abandon the traditional standard for measuring Indian water
rights. This Note rejects the notion that the PIA standard, as properly applied, is prejudicial
to Indians, and attacks the assumptions underlying this notion. See infra note 130.
20. See DAN TARLOCK, LAw OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 5:1 (2002) (noting
that "[p]rior appropriation has been adopted in whole or in part in the arid and semi-arid
regions of the United States").
21. Id. This system was deliberately adopted by arid western states as an alternative
to the common law "riparian" system inherited firom Europe and preserved in the eastern
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infrastructure, the doctrine grants the legal right to use a quantity of water
to the party that first puts it to beneficial use.2 2 States have interpreted the
term "beneficial use" as a requirement that water is used in a historically
recognized way, such as irrigation, mining, domestic, or industrial use.23 The
"priority date" of a claim is the date water is first put to beneficial use on a
piece of land. 4 Parties who subsequently appropriate water from the same
body have rights junior to prior appropriators. When there is insufficient
water to meet the needs of all appropriators, prior claims will be satisfied
first, irrespective of other considerations. There has been criticism of the
prior appropriations doctrine on the ground that it promotes inefficient use
of water by entrenching ancient utilization, and prevents future
development of unallocated water.2 6 Some anticipate the doctrine may be
overhauled in the near fiture to mitigate this problem.27 Nevertheless, some
form of the doctrine currently exists in the statutory scheme of nineteen
28western states .
B. The Origin of Federal Reserved Rights: Winters v. United States
Federal reserved rights are an exception to the requirement in prior
appropriation jurisdictions that water must be put to beneficial use in or-
der to be claimed2 9 Reserved water rights are claims to water appurtenant
states, under which owners of land bordering a body of water have the inherent right to
make reasonable use of the water that does not interfere with other users.
22. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45-151(A) (West 2003) (setting forth the prior
appropriation doctrine in Arizona law).
23. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 4 45-151 (B)-(C) (West 2003) (defining "beneficial
use" in Arizona). Some states have additional procedural requirements, such as obtaining a
permit from an agency or a decree from a court, that parties must take before their right is
considered fslly perfected. See Reed D. Benson, Maintaining the Status Quo, Protecting Estab-
lished Water Uses in the Pacific Northwest, Despite the Rules of Prior Appropriation, 28 ENVTL. L.
881, 886 (1998) (noting that "all four Northwestern states now require a permit applica-
tion to establish a new water").
24. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann § 45-151 (A) (West 2003).
25. Benson, supra note 23, at 886. There is no comparative cost benefit analysis or
other discriminating between competing uses on the basis of economic or social utility; see
DAVID GETCHES,WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 11 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter WATER LAW].
26. See CHARtES J. MEYERS & RIcHARD A. POSNER, MARKET TRANSFERS OF WATER
RIGHTS: TOwARD AN IMPROVED MARKEr INWATER RESOURCES 2-7, 40 (1971) ("The prin-
ciple impediment to fuill efficiency in the development of unappropriated waters lies in
the doctrine of beneficial use.").
27. TARLOCK, supra note 20, § 5:1 ("To stimulate the re-allocation of water, there are
mounting pressures on water rights holders to use existing allocations more efficiently. In
time, the concept of beneficial use, which is the lynch pin of prior appropriation, may be
redefined to mean the efficient use of water.").
28. See WATER LAw, supra note 25, at 74.
29. Todd A. Fisher, The Winters of Our Discontent: Federal Reserved Water Rights in the
Western States, 69 CORNEL L. REV. 1077, 1078 (1984) (noting that the prior appropriations
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to land set aside by the United States government for a specific purpose.3O
In prior appropriation jurisdictions, a reserved right to appurtenant water
vests in the federal government.3 ' The "priority date" of that right is the
date the reservation was established, whether or not that water has been
put to beneficial use.32
The doctrine of reserved rights was established in Winters v. United
States3 3 to protect the water rights of Indians on reservations." The case
concerned the water rights of the Fort Belknap Indian reservation, estab-
lished for the GrosVentre and Assiniboine tribes in 1889. Ten years later,
the federal government began constructing an irrigation project to divert
water from the Milk River, appurtenant to the reservation, for the Indi-36
ans. At approximately the same time, non-Indian settlers began diverting
water from upstream of the Reservation. For several years there was no
conflict, but in 1905 drought conditions left the reservation with insuffi-
cient water, and the federal government filed suit on behalf of the Indians,
against Henry Winters and the other settlers to enforce the Indians' right
38to the water.
The main issue in the lower courts was whether the government or
the settlers had first put the water to beneficial use and therefore gained
doctrine "[c]onflicts ... with the doctrine of federal reserved water rights . .. [which] exist
independently of beneficial use or quantification ... [and] are therefore fundamentally
different in character from rights established by prior appropriation").
30. See Gila V, 35 P.3d 68, 71 (Ariz. 2001) ("[When] the Federal Government
withdraws its land from the public domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the
Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the
extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation."). Reserved rights were first
recognized for Indian reservations, but the doctrine has been expanded to apply to other
federal enclaves. See, e.g., Cappaert v. United States, 128 U.S. 137, 138 (1976) ("The [Winters]
doctrine applies to Indian reservations and other federal enclaves, encompassing water
rights in navigable and nonnavigable streams."). The United States Supreme Court
explicitly extended the Winters doctrine to other, non-Indian federal reservations,
reserving water for wildlife refuges, national parks, and recreational purposes. Arizona I,
373 U.S. 546, 550-51 (1963); see also Fisher, supra note 29, at 1082.
31. In the case of an Indian reservation, the federal government holds both the land
and appurtenant water rights in trust for the Indians, and has a fiduciary duty to protect
the Indians use of the resource. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
221 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982) (noting that the principle that the federal gov-
ernment acts as trustee for tribes "[is one of the primary cornerstones of Indian law").
For simplicity, this Note will ignore this distinction, and discuss tribal water rights as if
they are held by the Indians directly.
32. See Royster, supra note 3, at 70.
33. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
34. See Royster, supra note 3, at 63.
35. Winters, 207 U.S. at 565.
36. Id. at 566.
37. See Royster, supra note 3, at 64.
38. See id. at 63-64 (noting that the government acts as trustee to Indians).
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superior water rights under the prior appropriations doctrine. 39 The Su-
preme Court mooted that issue, noting that the Indian lands "were arid,
and, without irrigation, were practically valueless, and thus could not sus-
tain the Indians., 40 The Court defined the Indians' right to the water in
broad terms, holding that even absent an express provision, Congress had
implicitly reserved as much water from the river as was "necessary for ...
the purposes for which the reservation was created" 4 ' The Court held
that the Indians' water rights had vested when the reservation was cre-
ated, 2 giving the tribes a senior claim.43 The Court did not quantify or
limit the scope of this claim, leaving open the question of how much wa-
ter was reserved for the Indians. 4
The Winters doctrine became a key component of federal Indian
policy at a time when the objective of the federal government was to give
Indians land where they could become farmers. 4' Absent adequate water
supplies, many Indian reservations would have been useless for farming,
46and unable to support their Indian populations.
C. Arizona I and the Practicably Irrigable Acreage Standard
for Quantifying Indian Reserved Rights
Reserved rights were rarely litigated, and remained unquantified
throughout the early twentieth century4 Eventually, demands on western
39. Id. at 64 (citing Winters v. United States, 143 F 740, 741-42 (9th Cir. 1906)).
The lower court held that some of the settlers water use preceded the government's water
use.
40. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
41. See id. at 576-77.
42. There was no dispute that the creation of the Reservation predated the appro-
priation by the settlers. See Royster, supra note 3, at 66 n.22.
43. The Court, relying on the canon that ambiguities in treaties, agreements, and
statutes should be resolved in favor of the Indians, reached this result despite the fact that
the actual agreement with the Indians was silent on the issue of water rights. See id. at 66
n.19 and accompanying text.
44. Mergen and Liu argue that "the Winters decision and most of the reserved rights
cases that immediately followed, held that Indians' rights should not be quantified, allow-
ing the entitlement to expand and meet the reasonable needs of the tribes." Andrew C.
Mergen & Sylvia F Liu, A Misplaced Sensitivity: The Draft Opinions in Wyoming v. United
States, 68 U. COLO. L. RIEv. 683, 691 (1997) (citing Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 161 E
829 (9th Cir. 1908) and United States v. Ahtanum Irrig. Dist., 236 E2d 321 (9th Cir.
1956)); see also Fisher, supra note 29, at 1082 ("In earlier reserved rights cases, the Court
had not closely examined what quantity of water was necessary to satisfy the purposes of
the reservations.").
45. COHEN, supra note 31, at 579.
46. Id.
47. Because tribes themselves had limited resources and infrequent government
assistance to develop irrigation projects or other infrastructure to utilize their resource
tribes, Indians were largely unable to put their theoretical Winters rights to use. There have
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water necessitated greater certainty, and the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed how such rights should be quantified in Arizona I.8 Arizona
initiated litigation to determine its precise share of the Colorado River
and the United States intervened on behalf of interested tribes.49 A
Special Master, appointed by the court to act as fact finder, found that five
reservations on the river had rights to water sufficient to provide for their
future needs.'0 The Special Master concluded that the correct measure of
the Winters rights was a function of the amount of reservation land that
could be irrigated and farmed, which he called a reservation's "practicably
irrigable acreage.' '" This measure tied the reserved water right to the
potential development of the reserved land.s2 He acknowledged that his
standard was "potentially generous," noting that more land was reserved
for Indian use than was necessary to support the current Indian• 53
population.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Special Master's conclusion on
the quantification of the water.' 4 Justice Black, writing for the majority of
the Court stated:
We also agree with the Master's conclusion as to the quantity of
water intended to be reserved. He found that the water was
intended to satisfy the future as well as the present needs of
the Indian Reservations, and ruled that enough water was
reserved to irrigate all the practicably irrigable acreage on the
thus been few controversies and courts have had limited opportunities to clarify the issue.
See Mergen & Liu, supra note 44, at 717 (noting that between 1908 and 1987 the United
states spent only $4.4 million constructing and maintaining Indian irrigation projects,
compared to $70 million spent on one major non-Indian Reclamation project alone).
Moreover, "with the exception of occasional litigation or acts of Congress applicable to
particular reservations, tribal rights to water in the decades after Winters were relegated to
the legal attic." Royster, supra note 3, at 73.
48. 373 U.S. at 595-601.
49. Id. at 546. Because the matter was between states, the Supreme Court had
original jurisdiction. Id. at 550-51.
50. See Mergen & Liu, supra note 44, at 690 (citing the Report of Special Master
Simon H. Rifkind 257-62 (Dec. 5, 1960)).
51. See Wes Williams Jr., Note, Changing Water Use for Federally Reserved Indian Water
Rights: The Wind River Indian Reservation, 27 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 501, 509-11 (1994) (not-
ing that "[t]he Court did not give a precise definition of practicably irrigable acreage
(PIA), but did approve a rough formula for quantifying the water rights").
52. See Mergen & Liu, supra note 44, at 690 (citing the Report of Special Master
Simon H. Rifkind 265-66 (Dec. 5, 1960)). The Special Master stated that "[an award
based on the current Indian population or needs would require open-ended decrees that
allowed for modification as the population changed in the future." Id. The Special Master
found this solution unsatisfactory "because it would jeopardize junior water rights and
hamper the financing of future irrigation projects." Id.
53. Id.
54. Arizona I, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
[VOL. 9:235
Abandoning the PIA Standard
reservations. Arizona, on the other hand, contends that the
quantity of water reserved should be measured by the Indians'
"reasonably foreseeable needs," which, in fact, means by the
number of Indians. How many Indians there will be and what
their future needs will be can only be guessed. We have
concluded, as did the Master, that the only feasible and fair way
by which reserved water for the reservations can be measured
is irrigable acreage."
Notwithstanding the agricultural focus of the PIA analysis, the Special
Master held that Indians were free to use their water however they wished
and were not limited to agricultural purposes. In his report, he wrote:
This [method of quantifying water rights] does not necessarily
mean, however, that water reserved for Indian Reservations
may not be used for purposes other than agricultural and re-
lated uses .... The measurement used in defining the
magnitude of the water rights is the amount of water necessary
for agriculture and related purposes because this was the initial
purpose of the reservation, but the decree establishes a prop-
erty right which [may be used] for the benefit of the Indians as
the relevant law may allow.1
6
Many commentators have noted that because Indian water use is
unrestricted that tribes may market their water absent other legal barriers,
arguing that not only is such a use legitimate but that for many tribes
marketing may be the best use of their water rights.57
55. Id. at 600-01.
56. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F2d 42, 48 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing the
Report of Special Master Simon H. Rifkind 265-66 (December 5, 1960)); see also Karen
M. Schapiro, An Argument for the Marketability of Indian Reserved Water Rights: Tapping the
Untapped Reservoir, 23 IDAHO L. REv. 277, 283 (1986) (arguing that "Indians should be able
to put their water to any lawful use").
57. See, e.g., Crass, supra note 12, at 119-24; George A. Gould, New Challenges to
Western Water Law: Transfer of Water Rights, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 457 (1989); Steven J.
Shupe, Indian Tribes in the Water Marketing Arena, 15 AM. INDrDiAt L. REV. 185 (1989).
Generally, prior appropriation water rights are considered a transferable property
interest by courts. See Gould at 459-60 (citing Maeris v. Bicknell, 7 Cal. 261, 263 (1857)
and McDonald v. Bear River Co., 13 Cal. 220, 232 (1859)). Agreements transferring water
interests may convey a water right permanently, lease it for a fixed term, or be more
complicated. See Shupe at 186-93 (cataloging various innovative transfer agreements).
Laws enacted by states impose several potential legal obstacles to water transfers. See
MEYERS & POSNER, supra note 26, at 5. For example, under western state law, water or
water rights cannot be transferred if another water user would be adversely affected. See
Shupe at 193; see also Gould at 463 (discussing origins and nuances of the "no injury"
rule). Some states, including Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota, have gone further,
enacting statutes that impede free transfer of water rights or that prevent transfer across
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D. Cases Since Arizona I Affirming the PIA Standard
Since Arizona I, the Supreme Court has twice reconsidered and up-
held the PIA standard. The first time was in Arizona 11.58 The tribes
affected by the 1963 decree argued that because the Special Master had
underestimated the amount of reservation land available for irrigation,
they were entitled to more water than they had been granted in
Arizona i. 9 The Court appointed a second Special Master,6  who recalcu-
lated the Indians' practicably irrigable acreage, and agreed that the decree
should be modified. 1
The Court approved of the Special Master's calculations, and
unanimously agreed that the PIA standard was still the appropriate measure
of water rights, although it ultimately rejected most of the Indians' claims
on other grounds. 6' However, Arizona II modified the PIA standard in a
way that changed the scope of PIA litigation. While the Special Master in
Arizona I only considered whether irrigating Indian land was technologically
state lines, often reflecting a desire to preserve "agricultural ambience" of the state. See
Gould at 461-63. Tribes may be immune from State restrictions on transfers, however, due
to their status as quasi-sovereign entities. Chris Seldin, Interstate Marketing of Indian Water
Rights: The Impact of the Commerce Clause, 87 CAL. L. REv. 1545, 1579 (1999) (citing
Collins, The Future Course of the Winters Doctrine, 56 U. COLo. L. REv. 481, 490 (1985)).
Contra Schapiro, supra note 56, at 288 n.60 ("Two Supreme Court decisions are read by at
least one commentator to suggest that tribal transfers, if allowed, will have to be limited to
protect junior appropriators .... The practical effect of such a limitation would mean that
the Indians could convey only a portion of their Winters rights.").
The primary barrier that Indians face when seeking to transfer their reserved rights
is the Non-Intercourse Act, which provides that, "[n]o purchase, grant, lease, or other con-
veyance of lands, or of any other title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of
nations shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or con-
vention entered into pursuant to the Constitution." 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1982). Because of
the Non-Intercourse Act, "tribes must have congressional permission to market their water
because Indians can transfer interests in reservation real property only if Congress con-
sents." See Marketing of Indian Water, supra note 4, at 542. The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed this
understanding, holding, "Because the use of reserved water is not limited to fulfilling the
original purposes of the reservation, Congress had the power to allot reserved water rights
to individual Indians, and to allow for the transfer of such rights to non-Indians." Colville,
647 F2d at 49.
58. 460 U.S. 605 (1983).
59. Id. 612-13.
60. Id. at 612.
61. Id. at 615.
62. Id. at 616. The Court decided five-to-three that substantially altering the prior
decree ran against "strong interests in finality" because it would injure non-Indian users
who had relied on the earlier determination. Id. at 620-21. Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Stevens and Blackmun, asserted that the revised determinations of the new Special
Master should have nonetheless been given effect, but otherwise agreed with the majority
position. Id. at 64 (dissenting in part and concurring in part). Justice Marshall did not
participate in the decision. Id.
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possible, the Special Master in Arizona II also required irrigation to be
economically feasible. In other words, he held that land is practicably
irrigable only if the economic benefits of irrigation exceed the costs.
4
The Special Master distinguished between economic feasibility and
financial feasibility."' 6s Economic feasibility requires only that a project
have a positive cost-benefit ratio, not that the tribe is actually able to raise• 66
the money to build the project.
In some ways, Arizona Irs modification of the PIA standard to
require tribes to demonstrate economic feasibility of potential projects has
made quantification of water rights more difficult for Indians. Economic
feasibility has proven to be a pliable standard that allows for significant
judicial discretion in estimating benefits and costs. Judicial determination
of economic feasibility has been characterized as creating a "battle of
experts" who "analyze the potential cost-benefit ratios of hypothetical
irrigation projects that potentially could be employed to irrigate the
63. Martha C. Franks, The Uses of the Practicably Irrigable Acreage Standard in the Quan-
tification of Reserved Water Rights, 31 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 549,567-73 (1991).
64. Walter Rusinek, A Preview of Coming Attractions? Wyoming v. United States and
the Reserved Rights Doctrine, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 355, 371 (1990) (citing Report of Special
Master Elbert P. Tuttle at 100 n.24, Arizona II, 460 U.S. 605 (1982) (No. 8, Original)).
Special Master Tuttle claimed, however, that his analysis did not differ substantially from
that of the Special Master in Arizona I. See id. In fact, a new detailed economic analysis
may have been unnecessary in Arizona II because the land had been previously surveyed
and deemed irrigable by Congress or the Bureau of Indian Affairs. See Fort Mojave Indian
Tribe v. United States, 32 Fed.Cl. 29, 38 (1994).
65. Franks, supra note 63, at 573 (quoting the Special Master's Report 96, February
22, 1982).
66. Rejecting the tribes' argument that government subsidies might be considered
in determining the economic viability of irrigation, and thus its "practicability," the Special
Master wrote:
The argument by the tribes, that the definition of practicably irrigable
should incorporate various subsidies to the Indian tribes, such that any analy-
sis is financial analysis from the point of view of the Indians, are misguided.
The past analysis accepted by the former Master and the Court clearly was a
non-Indian economic analysis measuring total benefits against total cost for
water without regard to the special considerations available to the tribes.
Id. at 573 (emphasis added); see also H. Stuart Burness et. al, The "New" Arizona v.
California: Practicably Irrigable Acreage and Economic Feasibility, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 517,
518 (1982) (discussing the distinction between economic feasibility, meaning the benefits
must exceed the costs, and financial feasibility, meaning a tribe's ability to repay those
costs); Mergen & Liu, supra note 44, at 695 (noting that economic feasibility is easily
confused with financial feasibility, as in the actual ability of tribes to procure funding for a
project).
67. See Franks, supra note 63, at 580 (describing conflicting testimony by experts as
to the proper discount rate during a trial in which Franks participated); Mergen & Liu,
supra note 44, at 696.
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reservation land so as to permit farming.' 8 Requiring tribes to
demonstrate the economic feasibility of irrigating their lands has made it
much more expensive for tribes to quantify their water rights, and
increased the likelihood that their claims will be denied.69 Nonetheless,
Arizona II was a victory for Indians in that it clearly reaffirmed that the
PIA standard was the proper method for quantifying the water rights of
Indian reservations.
Seven years after Arizona II, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the PIA
standard for a third time in In re The General Adjudication of All Rights to
Use Water in the Big Horn River System ("Big Horn 1'.) ° Wyoming filed suit
requesting a determination of the relative priority rights in the Big Horn
River basin, affecting the water rights of the Wind River Indian reserva-• 71 
7tion. The Wyoming trial court, on advice of a Special Master 2 applied
the PIA standard and granted the Wind River Reservation rights to
487,292 acre-feet of water. 3 The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the
68. Fort Mojave Indian Tribes, 32 Fed. Cl. at 29. Although this case concerned a tribe's
allegation that the United States had breached their fiduciary duty by failing to claim all
the water they were entitled to under the PIA standard, the method of quantifying PIA
was a central issue.
69. One tribe's Winters claims have been defeated due to their inability to demon-
strate economic feasibility. In State ex rel. Martinez v. Lewis, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals declined to disturb a district court's finding that a tribe's elaborate proposal to drill
through a mountain to irrigate mountainous land was not economically feasible. 861 P2d
235, 246 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993). See also Mergen & Liu, supra note 44, at 695 ("[T]he PIA
standard works to the advantage of tribes inhabiting alluvial plains or other relatively flat
lands adjacent to stream sources. In contrast, tribes inhabiting mountainous or other agri-
culturally marginal terrains are at a severe disadvantage when it comes to demonstrating
that their lands are practicably irrigable.").
70. 753 P.2d 76, 84 (Wyo. 1988) [hereinafter Big Horn I].
71. Id.
72. Id. at 85.
73. See Mergen & Liu, supra note 44, at 701. The Wyoming state district court
appointed Special Master Teno Roncalio to prepare recommendations on and in
December 1982, he issued a 451-page report on the Indian's reserved water rights. In his
report, the Special Master quantified the amount of surface water reserved for agriculture
on the basis of PIA. He recommended an annual award of 288,355 acre-feet for lands that
had been or were currently being irrigated. He also recommended an annual award of
188,937 acre-feet for lands that had not been previously irrigated and that an additional
20,000 acre-feet be set aside annually for non-agricultural uses and in-stream flows. Special
Master, Report Concerning Reserved Water Right Claims by and on Behalf of the Tribes of the
Wind Indian River Reservation, Wyoming Dec. 15, 1982, reprinted in Appendix to Petition
for Writ of Certiorari at 446a, 547a, Wyoming v. United States, 488 U.S. 1040 (1989) (No.
88-309). The district court affirmed the Special Master's award of reserved water rights for
PIA, but rejected the additional 20,000 acre-foot grant recommendation. See Mergen &
Liu, supra note 44, at 701. The court held that agriculture was the sole purpose, and
therefore PIA was the correct standard of quantification. Id.
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district court's application of the PIA standard and calculation of eco-
nonic feasibility three-to-two.
74
Wyoming appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that the PIA
standard should be rejected as the appropriate standard for measuring
Indian water rights because it gave Indians too much water.7' The Court
granted certiorari to review whether the PIA standard was still the
appropriate measure of Indian reserved water rights.76 The Court
ultimately affirmed the Wyoming Supreme Court's application of the PIA
standard four-four, without opinion, with Justice O'Connor abstaining."
It was later revealed that the Indians narrowly escaped a crushing defeat.
The conservative Justices of the Court were a heartbeat away from
joining an opinion, drafted by Justice O'Connor before she recused
herself, that would have accepted the arguments of state and private
interests and thrown out the PIA standard as it is currently applied.7 8 The
essential points of these arguments, set forth by those who wish to limit
the scope of Indian water entitlements, can be found in both O'Connor's
74. Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d at 96-101,103-04.
75. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court ofWyoming at 20-23,
Wyoming v. United States, 488 U.S. 1040 (1989) (No. 88-309) [hereinafter Petition].
Wyoming argued that the PIA standard was inconsistent with recent opinions expressed
by the Supreme Court in measuring non-Indian reserved rights. See id. n.20; see also infra
notes 80-107 and accompanying text.
76. See Wyoming v. United States, 488 U.S. 1040 (1989).
77. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406, 407 (1989) (per curiam) (reading in its
entirety: "The judgment below is affirmed by an equally divided court.").
78. See Mergen & Liu, supra note 44, at 684-85. Justice O'Connor recused herself
after she discovered a conflict of interest because her family owned a ranching corporation
on land affected by the adjudication. Recently, legal scholars discovered that prior to
recusing herself, O'Connor had drafted an opinion that would have commanded a major-
ity opinion of the Court, as Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy, were prepared to join
her, and Justice White would have concurred separately. Id. at 684 n.9. Justice Brennan
drafted a dissent, which Justices Marshall and Blackmun were prepared to join, and Stevens
drafted a separate dissent. Id. Drafts of Justice O'Connor's opinion and Justice Brennan's
dissent were discovered among 173,000 documents donated to the library of Congress by
Justice Marshall upon his death. Andrew Mergen and Sylvia Liu reproduced and com-
mented on these drafts in their article. See generally id.
Justice O'Connor accepted the petitioner's argument that the PIA standard, as ap-
plied by the Wyoming Supreme Court, was flawed because it was inconsistent with the
non-Indian reserved rights cases. See infra notes 80-109. Her opinion sought to signifi-
cantly narrow the scope of Indian reserved rights. See Mergen & Liu, supra note 44, at
706-08. She felt that sufficient water should not be granted to irrigate all practicably irri-
gable acreage; instead, she proposed that water should only be granted if the hypothetical
projects required to irrigate land were reasonably likely to be built, either by the federal
government or by the tribes themselves. Id. at 737. Further she felt Indian reserved rights
should be granted "with sensitivity" to non-Indian users. Id. at 706-08. In his vigorous
dissent,Justice Brennan noted that Indians were unable to use their reserved water because
they lacked capital or did not receive enough federal funds. Id. at 708. Mergen and Liu
argue that O'Connor's opinion is contrary to Supreme Court precedent defining Indian
reserved rights, and undermines tribal autonomy and self-sufficiency. Id. at 709-23.
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draft opinion and the Arizona Supreme Cour's decision to reject the PIA
standard.
II. ARGUMENTS BY STATE AND PRIVATE INTERESTS TO LIMIT
THE IMPACT OF THE PIA STANDARD
By adopting the practicably irrigable acreage standard, the U.S.
Supreme Court gave Indians potential control over vast quantities of
water, thereby reducing the amount of water controlled by states and
private interests.79 Opponents of broad Indian reserved rights have
formulated three major arguments to attack Indian reserved rights. These
opponents have sought to reduce the impact of the PIA standard, or
eliminate it entirely.80
A. Non-Indian Precedent Should Limit Indian Reserved Rights
First, opponents have argued that principles articulated by the U.S.
Supreme Court in two cases that adjudicated non-Indian water reserva-
tions, Cappaert v. United States"' and United States v. New Mexico,8 2 should
83apply to Indian reserved rights. They suggest that the PIA standard, as
currently applied, is inconsistent with these cases because it awards more
water than is necessary to fulfill the original purpose of Indian reserva-
tions and because it fails to weigh the interests of states and private parties
against Indian tribal interests in determining the scope of tribal water
rights.
84
1. The Restrictive Standards of Cappaert and New Mexico
In Cappaert, the Supreme Court articulated a minimalist standard for
determining implied reservations of non-Indian water. The Court
reviewed an injunction issued at the request of the federal government to
prevent extensive pumping of groundwater by the defendants, the
Cappaerts.8' The pumping caused a reduction in the water level in Devil's
Hole Monument, thereby endangering with extinction a unique species
79. See Crass, supra note 12, at 109. For example, the five tribes involved in Arizona I
received priority over 900,000 acre-feet of water per year. Arizona 1, 373 U.S. 596, 600
(1963).
80. See Crass, supra note 12, at 114-15.
81. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
82. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
83. See infra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Petition, supra note 75, at 20-23.
85. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 129.
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of fish that inhabited the pool.86 While the United States sought complete
elimination of groundwater extraction by the Cappaerts,7 the Court
affirmed an injunction allowing the level of the pool to drop to the point
where the fish were not endangered.88 Writing for a unanimous Court,
Justice Burger wrote, "the implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine,
however, reserves only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the
purpose of the reservation, no more.,89
The Court further restricted the interpretation of implied non-Indian
water rights in United States v. New Mexico.9° The Court was required to
determine how much water the federal government implicitly reserved
when it protected the Gila National Forest. 9' Following Cappaert's logic, the
Court had to determine the federal government's original purpose in
creating the forest in order to award the minimal amount of water
92necessary to satisfy that purpose. Five justices interpreted this purpose very
narrowly, determining that Congress intended only to preserve timber and
secure waterfowls and that "[n]ational forests were not to be reserved for
aesthetic, environmental, recreational, or wildlife-preservation purposes.,,93
The Court refused to grant more water than necessary to effectuate this94
narrow purpose, holding that water is necessary for a primary purpose of
a reservation only if, without that water, "the purposes of the reservation
would be entirely defeated."9' In contrast, any secondary use of water is not
reserved, and may only be acquired based on priority through beneficial
use under state law.96 The Court reasoned that its restrictive interpretation
of the original purpose of the reservation was necessary because
additional water devoted to the forest would come at the expense of a
"gallon for gallon" reduction in water available to state and private
*97interests.
86. Id. at 133,141.
87. Id. at 135.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
91. Id. at 698 (stating that the Court's task was to determine "what quantity of wa-
ter, if any, the United States reserved out of the Rio Mimbres when it set aside the Gila
National Forest in 1899").
92. Justice Rehnquist drafted the opinion in which Justices Stevens, Blackmun,
Burger, and Stewart joined. Id. at 696. Justice Powell filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall joined. Id. at 718-19. The dissenting opinion claims
that water should be deemed to have been reserved in order to sustain wildlife and foliage.
Id.
93. Id. at 708.
94. Id. at 700 (citing Cappaert, 526 U.S. at 128).
95. Id. at 700 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 702.
97. Id. at 705.
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Taken together, Cappaert and New Mexico narrow the scope of fed-
eral reserved water rights, at least with respect to non-Indian reservations.
First, Cappaert requires the minimum amount of water possible to achieve
the original purpose of the reservation be granted.9 Second, New Mexico
requires narrow construction of a reservation's original purpose, reserving
only enough water necessary for the narrow, primary purpose, but not
providing water for secondary benefits. 99 Third, New Mexico suggests that
reserved water should be granted with "sensitivity" to current state and
private water interests,'00 allowing the possibility that state and private in-
terests might outweigh federal interests under some circumstances.""
2. Application of Cappaert and New Mexico
to Indian Reservations
Although both Cappaert and New Mexico adjudicate non-Indian
reservations of water, opponents of broad Indian reserved rights have
argued that the logic of these cases should apply to all federal reservations,S 102
including Indian reservations. They further argue that these cases should
be read to implicitly overrule, or at least sharply limit, the "potentially
generous' 0 3 PIA method of determining Indian reserved water rights.
04
At least two courts have explicitly expressed the view that Cappaert
and New Mexico limit Indian reserved rights, even though they
adjudicated non-Indian reserved rights. In Colville Confederated Tribes v.
Walton,'0 5 the Ninth Circuit applied the principle articulated in New
Mexico,' °6 holding that Congress is presumed to have reserved rights only
98. Cappaert, 526 U.S. at 128.
99. See New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 708.
100. This aspect of New Mexico is sometimes called the "sensitivity doctrine" based
on language from Powell's dissent, which agreed with the majority's "sensitivity" to state
water interests, but disagreed with its interpretation of the intent of Congress. Id. at 718-
19.
101. Opponents of Indian reserved rights claim the "sensitivity test" of New Mexico
imposes an additional barrier to reserved rights by balancing them against state interests.
See Crass, supra note 12, at 115; see also Mergen & Liu, supra note 44, at 697.
102. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 29, at 1085 (arguing that the Cappaert case "marked a
turning point in the Court's reserved rights jurisprudence").
103. See Mergen & Liu, supra note 44, at 690 (citing the Report of Special Master
Simon H. Rifkind 257-62 (Dec. 5, 1960)).
104. Crass, supra note 12, at 116 (noting that "States quote the Cappaert statement
that the reserved rights doctrine 'reserves only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the
purpose of the reservation, no more' to support the argument that tribal reserved rights
should be quantified to a 'minimal need' standard"); see, e.g., Petition, supra note 75, at 20-
23 (setting forth such an argument).
105. 647 E 2d 42 (9th Cit. 1981).
106. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978) (noting that "[w]here
water is only valuable for a secondary use of the reservation, however, there arises the
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for the primary and not the secondary purposes of Congress in creating
the Indian reservation. °7 The U.S. Claims Court went further in White
Mountain Apache Tribe of Arizona v. United States,'05 stating that while the
PIA standard is still the accepted method of quantification of tribes'
reserved rights, it is restricted by Cappaert and New Mexico."09 White
Mountain and, to a lesser extent, Colville support the position of opponents
of broad Indian water rights that the limiting principles of Cappaert and
New Mexico apply to Indian reservations and therefore limit the scope of
Indian entitlements.
B. Indian Use of Their Reserved Water Should Be
Limited to Agricultural Purposes
A second argument waged by opponents of broad Indian water
rights is that tribes should only be able to use their water for agricultural
purposes because the practicably irrigable acreage standard should be
understood in an agricultural context. In other words, they argue that the
method of quantifying reserved rights should restrict the Indians' use of
the water."0 There is some judicial support for this interpretation of the
PIA standard, although it directly contradicts the view expressed by the
contrary inference that Congress intended, consistent with its other views, that the United
States would acquire water in the same manner as any other public or private appropria-
tor").
107. Colville, 647 F2d at 47.The Court of Appeals went on to find a broad primary
purpose for the Colville reservation that included creation of a fishery, and held that this
purpose was included in the implied reservation. Id. at 47-48.
108. 11 Cl. Ct. 614,626 (1987).
109. Id. at 626.According to the Court:
The term "practicably irrigable acreage" is now recognized as the quantifica-
tion of a tribe's Winters Doctrine rights. However, more recent Supreme
Court decisions manifest a restrictive interpretation of that measure. [Cap-
paert] stated that Winters had held that a reservation of water rights sufficient
to accomplish the purpose of the reservation is made when the Government
reserves land for a reservation or other federal enclave.... The law is now
settled that "Congress reserved 'only that amount of water necessary to fulfill
the purpose of the reservation, no more.' United States v. New Mexico
(quoting Cappaert and Arizona v. California). The Supreme Court in United
States v. New Mexico ventured a step further: "Each time this Court has ap-
plied the 'implied-reservation-of-water doctrine,' it has carefully examined
both the asserted water right and the specific purposes for which the land
was reserved, and concluded that without the water the purpose of the res-
ervation would be entirely defeated."
Id. at 626 (citations omitted).
110. See Schapiro, supra note 56, at 282; Shrago, Emerging Indian Water Rights: An
Analysis of Recent Judicial and Legislative Developments, 26 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1105,
1129-33 (1980).
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Special Master who originally defined the standard in Arizona ...
Wyoming Supreme Court Justice Thomas expressed this opinion in his
dissent from the court's affirmation of the practicably irrigable acreage
standard in Big Horn I." 2 He assumed that the PIA standard implicitly
limits an Indian reservation's purpose to agriculture. " ' While this
conception was not expressed by a majority of the Wyoming Supreme
Court at that time, in a later proceeding of the Big Horn River
adjudication, the court explicitly held that Indians could not change their
future water use without referring to state law.' 4 According to Karen
Crass, "limiting use in this way means tribes are not free to reallocate
water previously used for agriculture to other uses such as instream flow
or for natural resources development projects that might prove better for
tribes economically."'5 Under this interpretation of the PIA standard,
tribes that successfully quantify their Winters rights win a Pyrrhic victory;
the price they pay for their water is that they limit themselves to an
agrarian existence.
C. "Economic Feasibility" Should be Interpreted
Narrowly to Limit Indian Rights
Finally, opponents of broad Indian reserved water rights have argued
for an extremely narrow interpretation of "economic feasibility""16 in cal-
culating the practicably irrigable acreage of reservations. Some have
suggested that the unwillingness of private interests to fund irrigation
projects, and the fact that in recent years federal projects have not been
profitable, are evidence of the lack of economic feasibility of such pro-
jects." 7 One commentator argues that the cost of irrigating tribal land
111. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
112. 753 P.2d 76,119 (Wyo. 1988) (Thomas,J., dissenting).
113. Id. Justice Thomas would discard the PIA standard because it unfairly binds
tribes to use their reserved water only for agricultural use. According to Justice Thomas:
The fault I find with such a limitation is that it assumes that the Indian peo-
ples will not enjoy the same style of evolution as other people, nor are they
to have the benefits of modern civilization. I would understand that the
homeland concept assumes that the homeland will not be a static place fro-
zen in an instant of time but that the homeland will evolve and will be used
in different ways as the Indian society develops.
Id.
114. In re the Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
Sys., 835 P2d 273,282 (Wyo. 1992) (commonly known as Big Horn 111).
115. Crass, supra note 12, at 117.
116. See supra notes 62-69.
117. See Franks, supra note 63, at 578 (noting that PIA "forces the tribes to prove
economic feasibility for a kind of enterprise that, judging from the evidence of both fed-
eral and private willingness to invest money, is simply no longer economically feasible in
[VOL. 9:235
Abandoning the PIA Standard
should be multiplied by a discount rate that reflects the true "opportunity
cost" of using the money."8 In other words, the amount a tribe would
need to pay to obtain financing for a hypothetical irrigation project
should be included as a cost when evaluating economic feasibility. Fur-
ther, this commentator proposes that in determining the economic
feasibility of irrigating tribal lands, courts should include the "opportunity
cost" of alternate, off-reservation uses in the analysis.' 9 This would allow
Indian reserved rights only if Indians propose to put the water to better
use than the non-Indian user next in line for the water.20 These restrictive
interpretations of "economic feasibility" insure tribal PIA claims will be
small, as they allow tribes to claim only as much water as they have the
current financial resources to utilize, which is unlikely to be significantly
more than they have already put to use.
III. GiLA V REJECTION OF THE PIA STANDARD
Gila V1 2 marked the first time a court refused to apply the practicably
irrigable acreage standard for measuring Indian reserved water rights since
the U.S. Supreme Court established the doctrine in Arizona L122 Gila V pro-
ceedings began when parties interested in the Gila River petitioned for a
general stream adjudication. 23 In determining the entitlements of Indian
tribes along the river, the Arizona trial court applied the PIA standard.
The trial court rejected the notion that Cappaert and New Mexico created
uncertainty as to the proper method of quantifying Indian reserved rights,
holding that:
While as to other types of federal lands courts have allowed
controversy about what the purpose of the land is and how
much water will satisfy that purpose, as to Indian reservations
the courts have drawn a clear and distinct line .... [The reser-
vation is measured] by the amount of water necessary to
the West"); see also Big Horn I, 753 P2d 76, 119 (Wyo. 1988) (Thomas,J. dissenting) (mak-
ing a similar observation).
118. See Franks, supra note 63, at 581.
119. See Franks, supra note 63, at 573-74. This is a reformulation of the "sensitivity"
doctrine in economic terms.
120. Id.
121. 35 P.3d 68 (Ariz. 2001).
122. See id. at 81.
123. A general stream adjudication is a "legal proceeding involving multiple users
brought to determine ownership and characteristics of water rights to a river system or
other common sources of water." Conference Report, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 308
(2001) (quoting John E. Thorson, former Special Master for Arizona General Stream Ad-
judication).
124. Gila V, 35 P3d at 71.
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irrigate all of the practicably irrigable acreage ... on that reserva-
tion. 25
By declining to apply the limiting principles of Cappaert and New
Mexico to Indian water rights, the trial court obviated an inquiry into the
"primary" or "secondary" purposes of the Indian reservations, and
avoided the requirement that Indian water rights be adjudicated "with
sensitivity" to state and private interests. Instead the trial court relied on
the certainty of the PIA standard, as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court.
A. The Arizona Supreme Court's Justifications for
Rejecting the PIA Standard
1.The PIA Standard Prejudices Indians
The Arizona Supreme Court granted interlocutory review of Gila V
to "determine the manner in which water rights on Indian lands are to be
quantified," and ultimately rejected the PIA standard as the appropriate
measure. 2 6 The court's main criticism of the PIA standard was that it un-
fairly prejudiced Indians.
As a preliminary matter, the court disagreed with the lower court's
determination that Cappaert and New Mexico are inapplicable to Indian
water. Rather, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the original purpose
of the Indian reservations must be determined before water rights could
be allocated.127 Claiming to construe this purpose liberally,12" in light of
the reality that the federal government's true motives in creating Indian
reservations were often less than noble, 1-9 the court held that the purpose
of Indian reservations is to create a "permanent home and abiding place"
for the Indian people. " °
125. Id. (citing Order, September 9, 1988 at 17).
126. Id. at 72.
127. Id. at 73-74.
128. Id. at 74 (claiming that the general principle under Cappeart and New Mexico,
that the purposes of federal reservations must be construed narrowly in determining ap-
purtenant water rights, did not apply to Indian reservations).
129. Id. at 75 (citing Rusinek, supra note 64, at 406) ("[Tlhe fact is that Indians were
forced onto reservations so that white settlement of the West could occur unimpeded.").
130. Id. at 76 (citing Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 565 (1908)).The court
reasoned that creation of a homeland for Indians was the primary and only purpose of the
reservation, obviating the need to distinguish between primary and secondary purposes as
suggested by New Mexico. See id. at 76-77. Cosen's article praises Gila V primarily for this
aspect of the Arizona Supreme Court's decision. She writes:
On November 26, 2001, the Arizona Supreme Court introduced an element
of sanity and equity into the reserved water rights arena by concluding that
Indian reservations were actually established for the purpose of providing a
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The Arizona Supreme Court purported to reject the practicably ir-
rigable acreage standard because it was unfair to Indians and inconsistentS 131
with the "homeland purpose" of the reservation. The court gave two
reasons for this conclusion. First, it claimed that the PIA standard binds
tribes to an agrarian way of life because it requires them to use their wa-
ter solely for agricultural purposes. 32 The court took notice of the general
macroeconomic trend in the U.S. economy away from agriculture, and
concluded that the PIA standard constrained tribes in "the twenty-first
century, to use water in the same manner as their ancestors in the
1800's.' 33 The court further wrote that "[j]ust as the nation's economy has
evolved, nothing should prevent tribes from diversifying their economies
if they so choose and are reasonably able to do so.' 34
Second, the court criticized the "economic feasibility" requirement
of the PIA standard for placing an undue burden on tribes seeking to
quantify their reserved rights. It pointed out that the exclusive focus on
irrigable acreage works injustice against tribes inhabiting mountainous or
agriculturally marginal terrain, and risks the denial of reserved water to
these tribes. 136 The court suggested, however, that economic feasibility was
an unreasonably high bar for any tribe:
[L]arge agricultural projects [requiring irrigation] are risky,
marginal enterprises ... demonstrated by the fact that no fed-
eral project planned in accordance with the Principles and
Guidelines [adopted by the Water Resources Council of the
Federal Government] has been able to show a positive bene-
fit/cost ratio in the last decade [1981 to 1991].
37
home for Indians. More startling than the ruling itself is the fact that it took
93 years from the recognition of Indian reserved water rights by the U.S. Su-
preme Court for a state court to reach this conclusion.
Cosens, supra note 19, at 836 (citations omitted). I agree that the only sensible view of the
purpose of Indian Reservations is to create a homeland for Indians. However, I reject
Cosens assumption that the PIA standard is inconsistent with such a purpose, and I dis-
agree that the "original purpose" of an Indian reservation is relevant to quantifying that
reservation's water rights.
131. See Gila V, 35 P.3d at 76-79.
132. See id. at 75-76.
133. Id. at 76.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 78-79.
136. Id. at 78 (citing State ex rel Martinez v. Lewis, 861 P2d 235, 246-51 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1993)); see supra note 69.
137. Gila V, 35 P.3d at 78 (quoting Franks, supra note 63, at 578). The court also
quoted the following from Judge Thomas's dissent in Big Horn I:
I would be appalled ... if the Congress ... began expending money to
develop water projects for irrigating these Wyoming lands when farm more
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Thus, the court found that the PIA Standard forces tribes "to prove
economic feasibility for a kind of enterprise that ... is simply no longer
economically feasible in the West." 13 Ironically, the Arizona Supreme
Court claimed to reject the PIA standard in order to protect the affected
tribes from the consequences of a standard specifically formulated by the
U.S. Supreme Court to protect Indian interests.
2.The PIA Standard Prejudices State and Private Interests
The primary objection to the PIA standard expressed by the
Arizona Supreme Court was that it prejudiced Indians. Nevertheless, the
court suggested an alternate justification that was inconsistent with its
primary objection. In the two sentences at the end of its assessment of the
PIA standard, 39 the court noted that the standard "potentially frustrates
the requirement that federally reserved water rights be tailored to minimal
need.' 40 The opinion continued, "rather than focusing on what is
necessary to fulfill a reservation's overall design, PIA awards what may be
an overabundance of water by including every irrigable acre of land in the
equation. 1 4' Although it appeared not to rest its opinion on this
argument, this language suggests that the Arizona Supreme Court was in
fact concerned that the PIA standard was overgenerous, and thus
inconsistent with the limiting principle of Cappaert and New Mexico, and
unfairly prejudicial to state and private interests.
4 2
B. The Arizona Supreme Court's Standard
for Determining Water Rights
Instead of the practicably irrigable acreage standard, the Arizona
Supreme Court advocated a fact-intensive inquiry to determine the
fertile lands in the midwestern states are now being removed from
production due to poor market conditions. I am convinced that.., those
lands which were included as practicably irrigable acreage, based upon the
assumption of the construction of a future irrigation project, should not be
included for the purpose of quantification of the Indian Peoples' water
rights. They may be irrigable academically, but not as a matter of practicality.
Id. at 79 (quoting Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d at 119 (Thomas,J. dissenting)).
138. Id. at 78.
139. Id. at 79.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 80. The court cited Cappaert earlier for the proposition that the grant of a
reserved right must be tailored to "minimal need," and New Mexico for the requirement
that water must be so vital to a reservation's original purpose that "without the water the
purposes of the reservation would be entirely defeated." Id. at 73.
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amount of water necessary to create a permanent homeland. 4 3 This in-
quiry requires the consideration of such factors as a tribe's history, culture,
financial resources and economic base, the geography and topography of
the reservation, past use of water on the reservation, and the present and
projected population of a tribe.14 The court held that any proposed use
by Indians must be scrutinized for both engineering and economic feasi-
bility, an approach nearly identical to the PIA "economic practicability"
two-part analysis.' 4 The court further specified that the development
projects must be "achievable from a practical standpoint-they must not
be pie-in-the-sky ideas that will likely never reach fruition." 46 The opin-
ion suggested a presumption against irrigation projects, noting that
"[i]ncreasing the use of water for irrigation runs counter to a historic
trend in western water use the transition from agricultural to less con-
sumptive and higher-valued municipal and industrial uses."' 4 7 The Arizona
Supreme Court concluded with a nod to the "sensitivity doctrine sug-
gested in New Mexico, claiming the "minimalist approach" it used to
quantify Indian water rights in Gila V demonstrates appropriate sensitivity
and consideration to existing users of water.
49
IV. THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT ERRED IN
REJECTING THE PIA STANDARD
In refusing to apply the PIA standard, the Arizona Supreme Court
relied on the three major arguments advanced by opponents of the PIA
standard: that the PIA standard is unfair to Indians because it requires
tribes to use their water only for agricultural purposes, that proposed In-
dian use is rarely, if ever, "economically feasible," and that Indian
reservations of water must be narrowly tailored to the initial purpose of
the reservation. 50 The Arizona Supreme Court's decision is flawed be-
cause each principle is inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent.
The Arizona Supreme Court's reasoning therefore violates the holdings of
the U.S. Supreme Court with respect to reserved Indian water rights, its
interpretation of the practicably irrigable acreage standard, and the logic
upon which the standard relies.
143. Id. at 79.
144. Id. at 79-80.
145. Id. at 80-81.
146. Id. at 81.
147. Id. at 80 (citing Rusinek, supra note 64, at 410.)
148. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
149. Gila V, 35 P3d at 81.
150. See supra notes 79-120 and accompanying text.
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A. The PIA Standard Does Not Restrict Tribes
to Agricultural Use of Their Water
The Arizona Supreme Court claimed that the PIA standard allows
tribes to use their water only for agricultural purpose, and that
consequently the PIA standard prevents Indian tribes from developing
and modernizing. ' s' They argued that by requiring tribes to live an
anachronistic lifestyle, the PIA standard undermines the congressional
purpose of Indian reservations, to create a "permanent homeland and
abiding place" for Indians.1
2
This conclusion is based on the faulty assumption that PIA water
can only be used for agricultural purposes. This is the most obvious error
of the Arizona Supreme Court in Gila V, as this assumption is explicitly
contrary to the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Arizona L The
Court adopted the Special Master's report defining the PIA standard,
which established reserved water rights as a "property interest" to be used
or disposed of for the benefit of the Indians." 3 According to the Special
Master's report in Arizona I, tribes are free to use their reserved right in
any manner "such as the relevant law may allow" and are not restricted to
agricultural use.' 54
This language directly contradicts the Arizona Supreme Court's
assumption that the water awarded under the PIA standard may only be
used by tribes for agricultural purposes. Since tribes are free to use their
water, once quantified using the PIA standard, in any manner allowed by
law, then the standard will not constrain Indians "to use water in the same
manner as their ancestors in 1800's" as the Arizona Supreme Court
asserts.' -5 Thus, contrary to the Arizona Supreme Court's assumption,
using the PIA standard to quantify a tribe's water rights will not prevent it
from modernizing, since the standard in no way impairs the flexibility of
the Indians to use their water as they please. Consequently, the Arizona
Supreme Court's criticism that the PIA standard controverts Congress's
purpose of creating a permanent homeland for the Indians by forcing
them to live as their ancestors did in centuries past, is erroneous.
151. Gila V, 35 P3d at 75-76; supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
152. Gila V, 35 P.3d at 75-76.
153. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
154. Colville Confederated Tribes v.Walton, 647 F2d 42, 48 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing
Report from Simon H. Rifkind, Special Master, to the Supreme Court 265-66 (Decem-
ber 5, 1960)); see also supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (citing scholarship
discussing tribal water marketing as one legitimate non-agricultural use for PIA water).
155. GilaV, 35 P3d at 76.
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B. The Arizona Supreme Court Incorrectly
Defines "Economic Practicability"
The court is also wrong in its determination that the PIA standard is
too burdensome to tribes because it is nearly impossible to demonstrate
the economic practicability of irrigation projects. The court stated that
the PIA standard requires tribes to demonstrate the economic viability of
"a kind of enterprise that, judging from the evidence of both federal and
private willingness to invest money, is simply no longer economically fea-
sible in the West.',1
5 6
If irrigation is not economically feasible, then practicably irrigable
acreage would not exist. The fact that reserved water has been routinely
granted for tribes inhabiting agriculturally hospitable regions belies the
assertion that irrigation is not "economically feasible" as defined by the
Supreme Court. For example, the Gila V trial court conducted a thorough
analysis, and determined that the tribes in this case did have acreage that
was practicably irrigable.' In fact, only one court has denied the PIA
claims of tribes because it determined that irrigating their land was not
"economically feasible."'""
The paradox is resolved by closely examining how the Arizona Su-
preme Court conceived of"economic practicality." The opinion did not
define the term directly, but indirectly shed light on its usage.5 9 While
describing the criteria to be used in lieu of the PIA standard, the Arizona
Supreme Court directed the lower court to consider a tribe's economic
station, including its "technology, raw materials,financial resources, and capi-
tal ... 1.,,60 The court explained that this means proposed Indian water use
must be "economically sound" and achievable from a practical standpoint
rather than "pie-in-the-sky ideas."' 6' For the Arizona Supreme Court to
consider a proposed Indian water use project economically practical, the
tribe must have sufficient capital and financial resources to complete it. In
other words, the court equated economic feasibility, a positive cost-benefit
ratio, with financial feasibility, the ability to obtain financing and capitalize
the irrigation project.
The Special Master in Arizona II explicitly rejected an interpretation
of "economic feasibility" that includes these financial considerations.
6 2
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
158. The exceptions are the tribes considered in State ex tel Martinez v. Lewis, 861
P2d 235 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993). The tribes inhabited a mountainous region that required
an elaborate irrigation plan, which involved involving drilling through a mountain and
pumping water up 400 feet. Id. at 246-51; see also supra note 69.
159. Gila V, 35 P.3d at 80.
160. Id. (emphasis added); see supra note 144 and accompanying text.
161. Gila V, 35 R3d at 81; see supra note 146 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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His report, adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court, foreclosed consideration
of a tribe's ability to pay for a hypothetical project, requiring instead that a
project be evaluated on its cost-benefit economic merits. 3 He was con-
cerned that government subsidies would facilitate projects that otherwise
would not make economic sense in terms of cost-benefit ratio.6
However, his findings apply with equal force to projects that are currently
not financially feasible for tribes, but for which the economic benefits
nevertheless exceed the costs. Economic feasibility, defined as cost-benefit
ratio, rather than ability to capitalize, is the standard adopted by the U.S.
Supreme Court. It is also the standard utilized by the lower court in this
case to determine whether practicably irrigable acreage exists. 165
The Arizona Supreme Court's claim that the PIA standard is unfair
to tribes because irrigation projects are almost never economically feasible
is erroneous because it considers the Indian's practical ability to finance
their projects as a factor of economic feasibility. Like the court's claim that
the PIA standard binds tribes to agricultural use, this consideration is in
derogation of legal principles established by the Supreme Court, and al-
most universally accepted by other courts. Thus, the Arizona Supreme
Court's conclusion that the PIA standard deals unfairly with Indian tribes
is unsound.
The court made one argument relating to economic feasibility that
warrants separate consideration. The court noted that the PIA standard
discriminates against tribes on the basis of topography and geography by
granting water rights exclusively on the basis of irrigable acreage. 16 It is
true that the PIA standard was designed with tribes that inhabit deserts
and plains, with water running through arid but otherwise fertile soil, in
mind. This standard may therefore exclude some tribes with different cir-
cumstances. Nevertheless, it is unfair to strip an entitlement belonging
to most tribes because a few are excluded. It is particularly inappropriate
to violate Supreme Court precedent in this manner when the parties be-
fore the court are proper beneficiaries of the intended right.
163. See supra note 66.
164. See supra note 66.
165. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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C. The "Minimal Need"Analysis of Cappaert
and New Mexico Do Not Apply to
Indian Reserved Water Rights
While the Arizona Supreme Court spends several pages arguing
about how the PIA standard is unfair to Indians, 6" it devotes only two
169conclusory sentences to the proposition that the PIA standard "may po-
tentially frustrate" the minimal need requirement articulated in Cappaert
and New Mexico."" This approach seems disingenuous, since the Arizona
court advances, in place of the PIA, a formula based on a tribe's historical
use and financial resources that ultimately may give tribes little more than
what they had before litigation. 7 ' The court deliberately avoided resting
its holding on the arguments, asserted by opponents of Indian reserved
rights, that the PIA standard is not minimally tailored to the purpose of
the reservation or sensitive to non-Indian users. 7 2 Perhaps the court
avoided these arguments because the U.S. Supreme Court already upheld
the PIA standard over these objections.' Nonetheless, this is probably the
strongest attack on the PIA standard. Many commentators and judges
have viewed Cappaert and New Mexico as implicitly overruling or modify-
ing the PIA standard. 114 In spite of the Arizona Supreme Court's skirting
of the issue of the effect of Cappaert and New Mexico on the PIA standard,
consideration of the validity of the PIA in light of this recent Winters ju-
risprudence is warranted.
The essential question is whether the limiting principle articulated
in Cappaert and New Mexico (that only a minimal amount of reserved wa-
ter may be granted to fulfill a federal non-Indian reservation's narrowly
defined purpose) applies to the quantification of Indian reserved rights.
The Supreme Court affirmed the PIA standard more recently than either
Cappaert or New Mexico in Wyoming v. United States. 7 However, although
168. The opinion spends two pages discussing the history of the Winters doctrine,
including Cappaert and New Mexico. See Gila V, 35 P.3d 68,72-73 (Ariz. 2001). The Court
devotes nearly six pages to discussing the injustices of the PIA standard. Id. at 73-79.
169. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
170. Although the court concluded that a broad homeland purpose obviated a
primary-secondary purpose inquiry of New Mexico it emphasized the minimal need
principle. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 83-109 and accompanying text (discussing the minimalist prin-
ciples of Cappaert and New Mexico and their potential application to Indian water rights).
173. A major thrust of appellant's petition to appeal the decision of the Wyoming
Supreme Court in Big Horn I was that the PIA standard is inconsistent with the "restrictive
interpretation" dictated by Cappaert and New Mexico. See Petition, supra note 75, at 19-23;
see also supra note 78 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
175. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406, 407 (1989) (per curium); see also Crass,
supra note 12, at 116 (pointing out that the PIA standard was upheld in the Big Horn
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the Court officially upheld the PIA standard over allegations that Cappaert
and New Mexico undermine its viability, the release of Justice Marshall's
papers reveals that five Justices, four of whom are currently sitting on the
Supreme Court, were critical of the PIA standard.'7 6 A stronger
justification than pure stare decisis is therefore desirable to justify insulating
Indian reserved water rights from the limits of Cappaert and New Mexico.
In fact, Indian water reservations are distinguished from the reservations
discussed in Cappaert and New Mexico in three important ways.
1. The "Minimal Need" Requirement Is Inconsistent
with Cannons of Construction Pertaining
to Indian Rights
Unlike other federal reservations of water, Indian reserved water
rights warrant liberal construction because they concern Indians. Canons
for interpreting treaties and statutes require that "all ambiguities ... are to
be interpreted in favor of the tribes."'17 The original purpose of Indian
reservations was "to promote the well-being of tribes and to ensure their
self sufficiency."'178 In Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton,' 9 the Ninth
Circuit expressed the idea as follows: "the general purpose [of an Indian
reservation], to provide a home for the Indians, is a broad one and must
be liberally construed. We are mindful that the reservation was created for
the Indians, not for the benefit of the government. "' These doctrinal
principles are bolstered by the practical consideration that Indian
reservations are some of the "most economically depressed sectors of the
nation ''....and thus an overabundance of water resulting from the PIA
standard is an acceptable consequence of insuring that the interests of
adjudication, the most recent Supreme Court decision with respect to the quantification
of Indian water rights).
176. Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, and Kennedy were apparently prepared to join
Justice O'Connor's draft opinion. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. Although the
standard advanced by O'Connor's draft opinion was technically a modification of the PIA,
rather than an outright rejection, it applied the logic of Cappaert and New Mexico to
reduce the scope of Indian Winters rights. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. In
fact, the standard advanced in the draft opinion arguably went even further in limiting
Indian water rights, as the "sensitivity" principle may have required potential benefit to
Indians to be balanced against injury to State interests. This is not how the Arizona
Supreme Court applied the sensitivity doctrine. Gila V, 35 P.3d 68, 81 (Ariz. 2001) (noting
that its minimalist approach demonstrates appropriate sensitivity and consideration of
existing water rights without explicitly balancing their interests).
177. Cohen, supra note 31, at 221; Royster, supra note 3, at 65. Winters itself relied
explicitly on this canon.Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 565, 567-77 (1908).
178. See Mergen & Liu, supra note 44, at 713.
179. 647 E2d 42 (9th Cir. 1980).
180. See Mergen & Liu, supra note 44, at 717 (citing Colville, 647 F2d at 47).
181. Id.
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historically disadvantaged, disenfranchised people are protected. Because
Cappaert and New Mexico mandate narrow, rathe r than liberal,
construction of treaties and statutes reserving water rights, they are
doctrinally inconsistent with principles that concern Indians.
2. Indian Reserved Water Rights are
Judicially Implied Reservations
When courts adjudicate an express reservation of water,1 82 their goal
should be to determine the amount of water Congress intended to re-
serve. The same is not true for judicial recognition of implied reservations,
where the documents reserving the land make no reference to water.18 3 In
such cases, the judicial decision to grant water represents an equitable de-
termination by the court that a grant of water is necessary to promote
justice, rather than an interpretation of the original intent at the time the
reservation was created.
The reservations in Cappaert and New Mexico closely resemble ex-
press rather than implied reservations of water, because the policy makers
that created these reservations specifically referred to water in the docu-
ments creating the reservations.1 4 In Cappaert, the executive proclamation
that reserved Devil's Hole as a national monument specifically referenced
the existence of "a remarkable underground pool.' '8' This proclamation
noted the importance of preserving the pool, as well as a unique species
of fish found only therein.8 6 Similarly, the National Parks Act considered
in New Mexico explicitly addresses water.
87
Cappaert and New Mexico therefore suggest the following principle
of construction: When the federal government reserves a resource such as
water for a specific purpose, but does not explicitly define the quantity of
that reserved resource, the court will presume the quantity reserved to be
the minimum amount necessary to carry out the specified purpose of the
182. An express reservation of water is defined by documents that explicitly say what
water is reserved.
183. See Michael R. Newhouse, Note, Recognizing and Preserving Native American
Treaty Usufructs in the Supreme Court: The Mille Lacs Case, 21 PuB. LAND & RESOURCEs L.
REV. 169, 198 n.227 (2000) (noting that an implied federal reserved right exists where
"public land withdrawals (such as Indian reservations) are silent concerning water rights"
and that in such cases "a right to water on withdrawn land will be implied").
184. Technically the water reservations in Cappaert and New Mexico are implied be-
cause the documents creating these land reservations do not explicitly lay claim to a
quantity of appurtenant water.
185. United States v. Cappaert, 426 U.S. 128,132 (1976).
186. Id. at 132-33; see supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
187. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702-03 (1978) ("Congress author-
ized appropriations ... including the acquisition of water rights or of lands or interests in
lands or rights-of-way for use and protection of water rights necessary or beneficial in the
administration and public use of the national parks and monuments.").
FALL 2003]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
reservation. In other words, courts should presume Congress and other
governing bodies intend to carry out their purposes with as little intru-
sion on the rights of others as possible, unless otherwise specified. It is
appropriate that the federal government, a government of limited powers,
would do so, in order to minimally infringe on state and local preroga-
tives.
In contrast, the statutes or treaties creating Indian reservations made
no mention of water. '88 Indian reserved water rights have been created
and defined by courts, not Congress. The reservation of water is implied by
the Court. In the law, for a court to "imply" means "to impute or impose
on equitable or legal grounds." 89 When the Supreme Court "implied" a
reservation of water for the Indians in Winters, the Court was not engag-
ing in an interpretive exercise, but rather an equitable one. Similarly, when
the Court quantified the reserved amount of water as what is necessary
for practicable irrigable acreage in Arizona I, it made an equitable deter-
mination that Indian reservations should be granted a "generous" '90
supply, so as to avert any risk they would ever come up dry.'91 Perhaps the
court considered the quality of the land that the Indians were allowed to
keep, or the way they had been treated historically, but ultimately it de-
termined this was the "only feasible and fair way" to protect the Indians.
9 2
In some respects, it is absurd to speak of the original Congressional
"purpose" of the Indian reservations with respect to water rights. The
congressional "purpose" in establishing Indian reservations is unclear. Like
any legislation, it had numerous purposes and motives, one of which was
to get the Indians out of the way of White settlers.9 3 Most courts would
not be interested in effectuating this mandate today. The Arizona Supreme
Court's requirement, that only the minimum amount of water should be
reserved so as to fulfill the original purpose of Congress in creating the
Indian reservation, is therefore illusory.
3. Granting Indians Reserved Water Rights
is Economically Efficient
A third distinction can be made between Indian reserved water
rights and the water reservations in Cappaert and New Mexico. Granting
Indians water rights does not cause water to be removed from productiv-
ity and usually will not hinder state and private use. New Mexico suggests
188. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (noting that there is no express provi-
sion for water in the treaty at issue in Winters).
189. BLACK's LAW DICTIoNARY 333 (2nd Pocket ed. 2001).
190. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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that federal reserved rights should be construed narrowly because they
result in a "gallon-for-gallon" reduction in use by state interests.'94 This
was also the case in Cappaert."'9
However, this does not apply to Indian reserved water rights. Indians
usually do not have the resources necessary to realize their "paper" water
196 197rights, even after they are confirmed in court. The water projects
necessary to actually put water to use are often prohibitively costly, and
most tribes lack the financial resources to build them.' Thus, granting
Indians reserved water does not generally result in the diversion of large
amounts of additional water from state and private users.
Tribes care about preserving their reserved water rights in order to
protect distant future interests, when they might someday be able to
develop their water rights. Indians may also be able to market their water
rights.' 99 Justice Brennan, at the conclusion of his draft dissent in Wyoming
v. United States," ° states that what is truly at stake for Indians is the
possibility that tribes might market their water. 0 While there are still
barriers to tribes marketing the water granted to them under the PIA
standard, such as Congressional permission under the Non-Intercourse
Act,20 2 successful quantification of their claims at least provides a platform
from which tribes can negotiate. Even without Congressional
authorization to expressly lease their resource, tribes might be able to
extract some profit through deferral agreements, wherein a tribe bargains
not to develop or use a quantity of water if that use might injure a user
194. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
196. A "paper right" is a legal entitlement that is not necessarily realizable. See Susan
D. Brienza, Wet Water vs. Paper Rights: Indian and non-Indian Negotiated Settlements and Their
Effects, 11 STAN. ENVTL. L. 151, 160 (1992) ("From the Native American point of view,
the legal result of Winters v. US. and Arizona v. California is that the tribes possess strong
paper rights, yet the practical result is that with the concomitant and continued over-use
of the actual water by non-Indians, the tribes have very little wet water.").
197. See E. Brandan Shane, Water Rights and Gila River III: The Winters Doctrine Goes
Underground, 4 U. DEN. WATER L. REV. 397, 421 (2001) (noting that "paper rights" to sur-
face water are often of little or no use due to the lack of infrastructure to transport water
and put water rights to practical use"); see also Marketing of Indian Water, supra note 4, at 545
("So long as tribes lack capital, reserved rights will go unused and the tribes' senior prior-
ity dates will have little practical effect on non-Indian uses.").
198. As several commentators point out, many tribes' water rights would be defeated
if economic practicability required them to presently have the financial resources to build
the water projects they propose in PIA litigation. See supra notes 137-38 and accompany-
ing text.
199. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
200. The draft dissent was written in response to Justice O'Connor's draft opinion
prior to her recusal in Wyoming v. United States. See supra note 78.
201. See Mergen & Liu, supra note 44, at 709.
202. See supra note 57.
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downstream.0 3 A tribe might also agree to forgo lobbying the
government to build a project in exchange for some nominal
consideration. Even marginal water claims could provide some income for
tribes. The vast scope of their potential rights gives tribes value and
'04leverage. However, while this leverage may enable tribes to extract some
value from current users, it will usually not prevent current users from
continued use of the resource or cause large quantities of water to be
removed from production.
On the other hand, with Congressional approval, tribes could act as
water brokers. 2"' By transferring water interests to high bidders, tribal
marketing could be a mechanism for overcoming some of the inherent
inefficiencies of the prior appropriations doctrine.0 6 Indian tribes could
be the instruments through which western water markets are created.
Thus, while the Arizona Supreme Court criticized the PIA standard for
impeding the ability of tribes to modernize and tying them to antiquated
207uses of water, quite the opposite may be true. Proper interpretation of
the PIA standard could allow Congress to enable Indians to transfer their
substantial water rights and empower Indians to revolutionize western
water allocation. This could ultimately result in a more efficient use of
water in the western United States, substantially increasing the net benefit
to society.
CONCLUSION
Tribes were robbed of most of their land long ago. Now, the
Arizona Supreme Court reasons that they should also lose the right to the
water necessary to reap the full benefit from what little land they have left.
The Arizona Supreme Court abandoned the standard for quantifying
Indian water rights specifically designed by the U.S. Supreme Court to
guarantee Indians sufficient water to meet their future needs. The Arizona
court substituted a standard that in effect limits tribes to water they have
utilized in the past, or will be able to use in the immediately foreseeable
future. It is unfair that tribes should lose their water rights because the
government failed to quantify or develop their claims, and because
Indians lacked the financial resources to utilize their water before it was
usurped by others. The Arizona Supreme Court purported to reject the
PIA standard because it is unfair to Indians, but in its place it offered a
standard that gives tribes a shadow of what they had before. In the fight
for western water, the tribes of Gila V are the losers.
203. See Marketing of Indian Water, supra note 4, at 546.
204. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
205. See Crass, supra note 12, at 119-24.
206. See supra note 26-27 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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This is not the result the U.S. Supreme Court intended when it rec-
ognized Winters rights, or when it adopted the PIA standard. By
abandoning the practicably irrigable acreage method of quantifying In-
dian reserved water rights, the Arizona Supreme Court violated U.S.
Supreme Court precedent. The court's rationales for its deviation do not
justify its position. The PIA standard does not deal inequitably with
tribes. The Arizona court's assertions-that the PIA standard forces tribes
to live an anachronistic, agrarian existence, and that it is impossible for
tribes to demonstrate the economic feasibility of irrigation projects-are
both based on misapprehensions of the PIA standard and are contradicted
by the reports of the Special Masters in Arizona I and Arizona II respec-
tively.
The Arizona Supreme Court hinted at an alternate justification for
abandoning the PIA standard-that PIA gives Indians too much water
and is inconsistent with minimalist principles recently expressed by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Cappaert and New Mexico. This conclusion is also
invalid. Cappaert and New Mexico adjudicate reservations of non-Indian
water, and are distinguished from Indian reserved water cases establishing
the PIA standard in three ways. First, canons of construction require that
original documents be construed in favor of Indians, rather than in favor
of state and private interests.
Second, while in Cappaert and New Mexico water was intentionally
reserved by the federal government for a specific purpose, the notion that
Congress intentionally reserved water for Indians is a fiction. The "origi-
nal intent" underlying the creation of Indian reservations was largely to
get Indians out of the way of White settlers, with little concern for the
welfare of Indian peoples. Indian Winters rights were created by judges to
promote equity and justice by protecting Indian interests. Consequently,
an analysis of the original legislative or executive purpose in creating
these reservations, as required by Cappaert and New Mexico, is nonsensical.
Finally, while the reservations in Cappaert and New Mexico were ar-
guably economically inefficient because they resulted in water being
removed from economically productive use, upholding tribal claims will
not have this effect. Instead, it will place control over the resource in the
hands of Indians instead of non-Indians. Since tribes generally lack the
financial resources to develop their water claims, it will often be in the
best interest of tribes to market their water. With the cooperation of the
federal government, Indians could be the instruments through which in-
efficiencies in the prior appropriations system are overcome and water
allocation in the western United States is modernized. Absent such coop-
eration, tribes could negotiate settlements, agreeing to leave water in the
hands of current users in exchange for some nominal consideration. In
this way tribes could protect their future water rights and extract modest
value from their resource, while leaving present non-Indian uses largely
intact. In any event, water usage after the adjudication of tribal claims is
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likely to be at least as economically efficient as it was before their claims
were upheld, and has the potential to be much more efficient.
In sum, neither the holdings nor the logic of Cappaert, New Mexico,
nor any other case, justify the abandonment of the PIA standard.While it
is true that several current Justices of the Supreme Court have expressed
dissatisfaction with the PIA standard, and there is evidence that they
might be sympathetic to some of the reasoning of Gila V, these opinions
do not have the effect of law. Therefore, Gila V must be rejected as a
derogation of U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the supreme law of the
land.
